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Bonapartism in Algeria:
Empire and Sovereignty Before the Third Republic

Gavin Murray-Miller*

Abstract

Between 1852 and 1870, Napoleon III and his Bonapartist entourage successfully established a Second Napoleonic Empire that encouraged a “cult of the emperor” emphasizing the strong and even mystical bond between the sovereign and the people. While the “spectacular politics” of the Bonapartist regime have been examined in detail, far less attention has been given to how Bonapartist patriotism was applied within a colonial context and, more specifically, in relation to Algeria. This article examines iterations of Bonapartist dynastic patriotism and nationalist politics in North Africa. It argues that an evaluation of French imperial sovereignty and practices in the years prior to the Third Republic can help diversify our understanding of the French colonial experience and propose models that diverged from the narrative of republican colonialism in crucial ways during the post-revolutionary period.

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I.

At 5:30 A.M. on the morning of 3 May 1865 the sound of cannon fire was heard echoing along the coastal ports of Algiers. The thunderous shots signaled the appearance of the imperial yacht coming into port and an hour later Napoleon III stepped foot on Algerian soil for the first time in five years to cries of “*Vive l’Empereur!*”¹ To commemorate the Emperor’s visit to the colony, public celebrations abounded during the days with regal displays of French military prowess staged by the army and Muslim subjects entertaining guests with horseback riding demonstrations. In the evenings, the public buildings and mosques of the capital were illuminated with dazzling pale light. “It really was an enchanted spectacle,” the newly appointed governor-general Patrice de Mac-Mahon admitted when reflecting on the events.²

Napoleon III was the first head of state to visit the Algerian colony acquired by France in 1830. His two state visits during the 1860s signaled Algeria’s growing importance in both France’s expanding colonial empire and sense of national prestige. For colonists, the emperor’s visits were hailed as momentous events. The presence of the emperor not only symbolized Algeria’s importance to the mother country; it also offered colonists an opportunity to make known their aspirations for assimilation and civil equality with their compatriots across the Mediterranean.³ Above all, however, the occasion offered colonists a moment to demonstrate their patriotism to the emperor in person, affirming that they were a single French people united in their love and devotion to a common sovereign. Describing the fanfare that accompanied the emperor’s arrival, the journalist Joseph Guérin vividly captured the mood of the occasion, reporting: “the crowd was only a single soul and it emerges in the cry repeated a thousand times over of *Vive l’Empereur!*”⁴

Yet the pomp and festivities staged to welcome the emperor concealed an underlying anxiety which had been brewing in the colony since his previous visit in 1860. During the interval, Napoleon III had announced his latest Algerian policy, dictating to the consternation of many colonists and high-ranking military officials that Algeria was to be considered an “Arab Kingdom” rather than a French colony “strictly speaking.” The tone of his speeches while touring the colony reflected this new outlook, evincing a noticeable concern with Algeria’s vast Muslim majority and a commitment to regenerating an indigenous Arab nationality. “When France placed its foot on African soil thirty-five years ago,” he declared before an audience of Muslim, Jewish and European subjects assembled in Algiers, “it did not come to destroy the nationality of a people but, on the contrary, to lift this people from an old oppression.”⁵ Such pronouncements were a far cry from the emperor’s bold statement in 1852 pledging that “across from Marseille we have a vast territory to assimilate to France.”⁶

These apparent incongruities say much about the Bonapartist movement in France. Originating with Napoleon I and persisting under subsequent regimes during the post-revolutionary period, Bonapartism, as a political movement and ideology, has often been characterized by a “permanent ambiguity.”⁷ The political eclecticism encouraged by leading Bonapartist ideologues and the absence of any definitive Bonapartist party in the country have made pinning down the core ideological tenets associated with Bonapartism exceedingly difficult. John Rothney once spoke of an “entire Bonapartist spectrum” extending from the extreme right to the radical left while other historians such as Sudhir Hazareesingh have noted the “remarkably plastic and synthetic qualities” which made Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon III), nephew of the former emperor, appealing to a wide range of public opinion at mid-century.⁸ To some degree, the elusive nature of Bonapartism stems from its eclectic

character, which permitted the Second Napoleonic Empire created in 1852 to draw upon traditional monarchial and imperial discourses while equally promoting democratic and nationalist policies. Without doubt, the seeming contradictions of the Second Empire were many: it reached out to liberals and conservatives, urban workers and the rural peasantry alike; it promoted the industrial sciences and nationalism while simultaneously cultivating relations with Catholic leaders and religious notables; it presented itself as a populist government while maintaining a regal court culture.⁹ Given these contradictions, it is easy to see how Bonapartism may appear opportunistic or incoherent. Yet to claim so would misconstrue one of the fundamental premises that underpinned what Louis Napoleon Bonaparte once called the “Napoleonic Idea.”

At base, Bonapartism rested upon a specific idea of the sovereign, one that sacralized the relationship between emperor and subject. Its ability to identify with different social and ideological groups was one of its hallmark features, presenting a political model that ran counter to Rousseauist ideas of republican unity promoted during the French Revolution. Although conventional narratives present the modern “nation form” sweeping away older arrangements vested in confessional, local or dynastic identification, in reality imperial and dynastic models continued to predominate over communitarian ideas of nationhood or isonomic republican principles in the post-revolutionary period.¹⁰ The First Napoleonic Empire showed itself willing to promote a brand of “cosmopolitanism” in Egypt and Europe consistent with multiethnic empires like those governed by the Habsburgs and Ottomans. Different ethnic and confessional groups were, to varying degrees, tolerated and administered through distinct state institutions contrary to republican notions of civic uniformity.¹¹ Throughout the nineteenth century imperial and monarchial forms persisted in tandem with nationalizing tendencies, and French

Bonapartism was no difference in this respect. It oriented itself toward a polity and style of rule which Daniel Unowky has identified as state or “dynastic patriotism.”¹² At its center stood the sovereign reimagined as a veritable icon embodying all the attachment to people and country that the term “patriotism” evoked.

The festivities, political speeches and cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* that accompanied the imperial visits to Algeria during the 1860s revealed this “dynastic patriotism” in action. That said, scholars have rarely considered the implication of Algeria when considering Bonapartism. The vast amount of scholarship on the Second Empire has privileged a metropolitan framework, resulting in an incomplete picture of imperial politics and sensibilities. Post-revolutionary French imperialism has only recently begun to receive more thorough attention from historians.¹³ David Todd’s acknowledgment of a “French imperial meridian” has proposed a framework in which to consider how regimes prior to the Third Republic imagined the modern colonial empire and contributed to the making of a national colonial culture.¹⁴ Examining Bonapartism in its Algerian iteration furnishes a context in which to evaluate key themes of imperial sovereignty and dynastic patriotism that played a central role in this process. It also revises older interpretations of Bonapartist “authoritarianism” which have identified a Bonapartist movement through its right-wing, overtly nationalist and anti-democratic elements.¹⁵ In this view, it would be easy to draw a straight line between Bonapartism and the authoritarian, racist settler nationalism that developed in Algeria in later years. This continuity between an authoritarian politic and what Samuel Kalman has called “colonial fascism” should, however, be questioned.¹⁶ The blending of dynastic and national ideas that constituted Bonapartist conceptions of sovereignty may have focused attention on a cult of the leader, but its basic principles rejected the forms of xenophobia and racialized nationalism that characterized the radical French right later in the century. At its

core, Bonapartism provided a framework adaptable to ruling over a multiethnic empire that mixed ideas of revolutionary nationalism and dynastic loyalty in equal measure.

During the 1860s, Algerian officials and colonists showed a willingness to adopt the Bonapartist script. Publicists and colonial interest groups relied heavily upon prevailing discourses of Bonapartist democracy in framing requests for state patronage and representative institutions through the decade. Local officials organized and shared in the celebrations of national-imperial sovereignty staged during the state visits, repeatedly emphasizing Algeria's special relationship with France through Napoleonic symbols and mass expressions of dynastic loyalty. In making appeals to Algeria's native population, ceremonies readily evoked memories of the Napoleonic Egyptian expedition. Aspirations of "regenerating" a decadent Orient and attempts to paint Napoleon III as an "Arab" emperor consciously harkened back to Napoleon I's earlier efforts at "playing Muslim," inscribing the process of Algerian colonization within the context of a veritable Bonapartist tradition.¹⁷

These manifestations of Bonapartist political culture not only provided a conceptual space for the representation of Algeria within public life; they also hinted at an alternative vision of colonial empire distinct from republican ideas vested in citizenship and assimilation. French colonial studies have often highlighted struggles over political rights and the inability to square a secular, universalist ideology with the realities of imperial diversity. In this regard, historians have drawn attention to the inequalities and exclusionary practices that routinely pitted a white European settler community invested with rights against a disenfranchised colonized population. While these inequalities should not be ignored or trivialized, they are part of a larger narrative that has sought to explain, whether explicitly or implicitly, the shortcomings of the republican civilizing mission and the many contradictions it engendered.¹⁸ This conclusion was, however,

never pre-determined. Prior to the founding of the Third Republic, republican discourses vied with competing ideologies and nation-building programs during the post-revolutionary period. Debates over rights and citizenship existed alongside rival iterations of sovereignty, entailing that republican colonialism was only one among various imperial imaginaries in the nineteenth century.¹⁹ Bonapartism proposed a system capable of governing a multiethnic state and held out the possibility of an imperial polity that blended democratic practices with dynastic authority. Only after 1870 did republican isonomy and assimilation become the predominant elements of a colonial state and culture that has since assumed primacy in our understanding of the French imperial experience.

Taking the idea of a “French imperial meridian” seriously entails looking beyond the discourses of French republicanism and accounting for the divergent articulations of imperial sovereignty that shaped the evolution and practices of empire in France. An assessment of Bonapartist political culture in Algeria permits us to reconstruct an alternative vision of empire that paralleled nineteenth-century republican colonialism, contextualizing the demands for rights and inclusion that routinely burdened the *république coloniale* over the course of its existence.

II.

With the establishment of universal manhood suffrage in 1848, French politics assumed an imminently popular and democratic character in spirit if not in practice. The Bonapartists of the mid-nineteenth century understood this new political culture perfectly. They adeptly employed symbols and mass spectacles to create and sustain a Second Napoleonic Empire that was ostensibly progressive in spirit while authoritarian in character.²⁰ Through a series of national referendums, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte legitimated his illegal coup d'état in 1851 and founded

his imperial government a year later with popular support. He was hardly being flippant when he appeared before the assembly in the spring of 1852 and remarked “the head of state you have before you is the expression of the popular will.”²¹ In the terms of Bonapartist democracy, the people had empowered the government through a single vote, “clear, simple, and understood by all,” rendering the new Napoleon a manifestation of the general will.²² As one propagandist put the matter bluntly: “Bonapartism is now what it has always professed to be, the legitimate representative of national sovereignty.”²³

Studies on Bonapartism and the Second Empire have frequently stressed the national tenor of imperial politics, especially in relation to the specific conception of national sovereignty that underwrote the idea and practice of Bonapartist democracy.²⁴ The Bonapartist revival was a product of the nationalist resurgence that grew up during the 1840s and consciously presented itself as a popular movement with deep roots in the French national soil.²⁵ “Before [the Empire] rallied all the forces of the nation, it was born in the cottages of the people,” proclaimed the inveterate Bonapartist, the Duc de Persigny.²⁶ This rhetoric extended, however, beyond simple veneration for the French nation and people. From its origins in the late-eighteenth century, Bonapartism had persistently emphasized the strong and even “sacred” link that united sovereign and people. This pact was a consistent centerpiece of Bonapartist political discourse throughout much of the century.²⁷ It rested upon the belief that the emperor, empowered through national referendums, faithfully represented the sentiments and will of the nation. It was this peculiar mix of Rousseauist volunteerism and executive autonomy that gave Bonapartism its distinct character and ideological import.²⁸

Efforts to objectify this sacred bond encouraged public spectacles featuring the emperor and the imperial family. Over the 1850s and 1860s, Napoleon III appeared regularly at ribbon-

cutting ceremonies and national exhibitions throughout the country. Even when absent, the sovereign was evoked in speeches or represented on ceremonial medals and prizes distributed at events. Statesmen used recourse to old Napoleonic memories to impart an imminently national character to the Second Empire and instructed officials to appeal to “the Napoleonic sentiment of the people” at every opportunity.²⁹ Public festivities regularly featured imperial eagles and large letter Ns adorning buildings while Napoleon I’s birthday was made an official *fête nationale* in the hope of replacing the collective memory of the Revolution with that of the First Empire and Bonaparte family.³⁰ Focusing attention on the Napoleonic cult, Bonapartist ideologues endeavored to present the family as a national dynasty, one capable of attracting support from monarchists who had never accepted the nation’s republican heritage. They were careful to avoid the conservative and aristocratic royalism of the former Bourbon line, distinguishing the Bonapartes as a popular dynasty endowed with the necessary *esprit national* and patriotism capable of uniting the nation.³¹ “The Napoleonic dynasty, deriving from the ranks of the nation, cannot forget that it *belongs to everyone*,” as one writer stated.³²

These iterations of national sovereignty and dynastic heritage were hardly a clumsy attempt to dress royal pretensions in a national garb. By its very nature, Bonapartist politics relied upon a distinct style of public spectacle and nationalism centered on the figure of the sovereign and his link to the people. It was an affective politic based as much on emotional attachment to the leader as on its synthetic ideological content. As late as 1870, the journalist and politician Adolphe Granier de Cassagnac testified to the resilience of the Bonaparte cult, insisting that the majority of French peasants cared little for day to day politics or debates in the Corps législatif. “The rural populations know only the Emperor, want only him and will vote only for him.”³³

Napoleon III's public persona and presence were important to the success and vitality of the new government. Public appearances by the emperor were routinely presented in newspaper accounts and imperial travel literature, both of which served as important channels of government propaganda. At the inauguration of the Boulevard de Sébastopol in Paris in 1858, the pro-imperial newspaper *Le Constitutionnel* focused attention on the enthusiasm of the crowd, insisting, "Nation and Emperor think and act with the same confidence and the same sympathy."³⁴ In an account of the emperor's tour of the empire in the autumn of 1860, authors did not fail to emphasize the "immense crowd" that turned out to greet the imperial family at Lyon or the "impatient cries" of those waiting to catch a glimpse of their leader.³⁵ Moving on to Avignon, the family received an "enthusiastic welcome" from thousands of spectators while days later the imperial palace in Corsica was thronged by a "passionate crowd" expressing their devotion to the sovereign.³⁶ Lively descriptions (and inflated statistics) of excited crowds clamoring to welcome the emperor were a common trope in newspaper accounts. Vivid illustrations frequently accompanied the descriptions that appeared in book form during the 1850s and 1860s. Whether in word or image, such media was intended to provide readers with a virtual experience allowing them to participate vicariously in the ecstasy of the crowd and partake in that sacred link uniting sovereign and people. More than simply propaganda, newspaper accounts and imperial travel literature were part and parcel of the Bonapartist political culture elaborated during the mid-nineteenth century.

In some instances, authors barely disguised their motivations. In his account of the emperor's trip to Algeria in 1865, René de Saint-Félix spelled out in no uncertain terms the importance he attributed to the official visit. His tome was intended to show that "the love of the populations, already so profoundly attached to the Napoleonic dynasty, has been reinforced in

seeing this strong monarch.” While modesty may have compelled Saint-Félix to assure his readers that his account contained only “sincere and disinterested considerations,” the didactic intent of the work was not hard to mistake. In the author’s own words, the book aimed to “teach many of our citizens, not only to love the Emperor—the voice of the people has already proven the unanimity of their sentiments—but to better understand and comprehend the providential man who, retaking the hereditary scepter, has committed himself to leading France along the path of justice, glory and prosperity.”³⁷ Saint-Félix’s *Napoléon III en Algérie* was one of the more blatantly Bonapartist pieces of imperial travel literature to appear in the 1860s, but others similarly linked themes of public visibility, dynastic patriotism and imperial sovereignty in more nuanced ways.

Saint-Félix’s account was not, however, complete fabrication. Bonapartist pageantry was in full display during the two official trips to Algeria. Upon disembarking from the imperial yacht in 1860, the mayor of Algiers greeted the imperial family and presented Napoleon III with the key to the city. Before a crowd amassed on the waterfront, he insisted “It is from the depth of our heart that, all together, soldiers and citizens, we cry: *Vive l’Empereur!*” Much as Joseph Guérin would indicate five years later, it was through a mutual devotion to the emperor that the unity of the Algerian people was made manifest. This ardor carried over into the official ceremonies staged during the imperial family’s visit. As the emperor laid the corner stone of the newly-planned Boulevard de l’Impératrice in the city, the “enraptured” crowd once again assumed center stage. “It is easy to see that a violent emotion agitates [the crowd] and that it makes every effort to contain it,” one account reported.³⁸ Testaments of impassioned onlookers with tears of joy streaming down their cheeks and zealous cries of affection conformed to the Bonapartist script of national sovereignty and dynastic patriotism. “It was like an electrical

commotion,” claimed one writer when describing the emperor’s appearance in Boufarik. “Every soul vibrated in unison and joy overflowed in every heart—a bursting, communicative joy bordering on delirium.”³⁹

Yet if these visits to the colony bore the familiar marks of Bonapartist spectacle, the Algerian crowds possessed a noticeable difference. Whereas “the crowd” was often depicted as a homogenous body in France, observers were quick to note the diversity found among the crowds that turned out in Algeria. The mix of French, European and native spectators all scrambling to catch a glimpse of the sovereign imparted “a character as moving as it is *pittoresque*,” according to one commentator.⁴⁰ As a colonial society, Algeria comprised a mosaic of French, Spanish, Maltese, Greek and Italian settlers, not to mention the Turkic peoples remaining from years of Ottoman rule and the sizeable Arab and Berber populations indigenous to the region. Visitors and officials commonly remarked on the variegated nature of the colonial population, finding “a strange, quaint and dazzling multiplicity,” a “veritable Babel” of dress and languages or “a human kaleidoscope.”⁴¹ Allusions to North African diversity were not, however, merely descriptive. Rather, they reiterated popular perceptions of Oriental heterogeneity implying that Algerian inhabitants lacked a national consciousness capable of constituting a proper nation.⁴² In “civilizing” Algeria, France was committed to a project of Oriental “regeneration,” a mission interpreted in terms of bequeathing a national identity and unity to a hopelessly divided society. “All the people of diverse origins, mores, customs, languages, races and religions [will] form only a single people: the Algerian people,” extolled the colonial publicist Jules Duval in 1852. Such would be “the capital work of France in the nineteenth century.”⁴³

Bonapartist discourse added a specific twist to aspirations for Algerian unity. Beside the fusion promised by a common French language and nationality rested the relationship between

subject and sovereign central to Bonapartist ideology. The two were not mutually exclusive and could support one another. In 1865, the mayor of Algiers stated as much, noting in his address to the emperor that while Algeria was diverse it nevertheless possessed a unity in and through the sovereign. “You find here a population which although of different races and origins comes together under a single flag, that of France, and knows only a Sovereign that it acclaims at this moment.”⁴⁴ Other demonstrations of this unity could, however, prioritize the sovereign over assumption of national or cultural unity. In 1860, when colonial subjects erected mock Arc de Triomphes in anticipation of Napoleon III’s visit, each ethnic group presented their own version of this Napoleonic monument, outfitting it with stylistic flourishes evincing unique Spanish, Jewish or Arabic influences.⁴⁵ The fact that the Emperor met separately with Arab, Kabyle and Jewish delegations during the course of his visit only highlighted the complexities that Bonapartist discourse invited. In a multiethnic society like Algeria, the question of what, in fact, constituted this envisaged national unity was never clear cut. Under the circumstances, devotion to the sovereign and devotion to a French *patrie* might not be one and the same.

III.

If public displays of devotion and cries of *Vive l’Empereur!* constituted part of the Bonapartist script governing national sovereignty, they also demonstrated the elastic nature of dynastic patriotism and the ways in which it could simultaneously accommodate national and colonial projects. From the beginning of his reign, Louis Napoleon revealed a willingness to inscribe political spectacles with imperial flourishes. Meeting the Islamic scholar and Algerian resistance leader Abd-al Qādir at the Palais Saint-Cloud in January 1852, Louis Napoleon treated him with an air of dignity befitting his notoriety in the Muslim world and permitted the *bête-noire* of the

Armée d'Afrique to carry out the traditional Islamic *salāt*. "Today, for the first time ever," the official broadsheet *Le Moniteur* declared, "the Palais de Saint-Cloud heard the prayer of a Muslim."⁴⁶ That spring, a national military festivity staged at the École Militaire featured a half-dozen Arab notables whom Louis Napoleon awarded with the Croix de la Légion d'honneur.⁴⁷ North Africa was never wholly absent in Bonapartist political pageantry and typically found a place alongside public celebrations of national sovereignty. These publicized events may have been aimed at nurturing a colonial consciousness and identity for the nation, but they equally testified to a discourse of imperial sovereignty that ran through Bonapartist politics.

As the ruler of a multiethnic and multi-confessional empire, Napoleon III employed spectacle to legitimize his rule and cultivate loyalties among metropolitan citizens and colonial subjects alike. In Algeria, these forms of spectacle assumed a varied character. By the 1860s, imperial officials showed themselves disposed to consider Maghribi Arabs as a distinct national group, opening the possibility of recognizing certain national and cultural dispensations for Algeria's native community. In seeking a solution to the troubling "Algerian question," military officials in the Arab Offices criticized policies of overt national assimilation and Gallicization, arguing they only served to divide colonial society. Equitable treatment and native social integration rather than European colonization and dominance offered a more conciliatory approach, in their view. The question of whether Algeria was even a French colony at all was broached, with Napoleon III referring to it as an "Arab Kingdom" linked to France rather than a colony.⁴⁸ While controversial, the Arab Kingdom policy marked a quintessentially Bonapartist approach to the Algerian question. It not only accorded with the Second Empire's veneration for the principle of *nationalité*; it was also consistent with prevailing ideas of Napoleonic leadership. Bonapartist ideology was dependent upon incarnating the special relationship linking sovereign

and people, and this premise offered a model capable of organizing a diverse imperial community spanning the Mediterranean. An ostensibly “Arab” constituency constituted one community among a constellation of others, all associated through the imperial sovereign representing the national will.

European colonists were naturally averse to talk of Arab nationality and integration, interpreting such policies as an affront to their aspirations for a French Algeria. Moreover, many settlers retained strong republican convictions that did not necessarily mesh with Bonapartist notions of authority.⁴⁹ Colonists had only marginally supported the coup d’état and the establishment of the Bonapartist regime in 1851. The majority of support had come from the countryside, which “advantageously counterbalanced the negative votes of the cities,” as Auguste Bourget, editor of the Algerian daily *Akhbar*, remarked.⁵⁰ Notoriously famous for his ideological flexibility and ability to sense which way the political winds blew in France, Bourget became one of the foremost publicists of the Napoleonic regime in the colony in the early 1850s, adroitly crafting his position to the new political culture and taking up the Bonapartist script. He urged Algerian electors to ratify the new regime and rally to the “unanimous voice of the *patrie*” in supporting Louis Napoleon Bonaparte.⁵¹ Following the Bonapartist victory of 1852 his paper carried detailed reports of the public celebrations organized in Algiers, describing scenes in which enthusiastic colonists displayed portraits of Napoleon I in illuminated windows.⁵² F. C. Beaumont, a regular contributor to *Akhbar* in the early 1850s, went further in his adulation. “Saved and regenerated, France puts all its hope for the future in [the new Napoleonic Empire],” he claimed.⁵³ In Beaumont’s opinion, he believed that the rise of a new Napoleon signified “the time of monumental things has come for Algeria.”⁵⁴

Prescriptions to look to the emperor himself as a source of beneficence and largess became a staple of both national and colonial discourse. A book published on the occasion of the emperor's visit to Marseille in 1860 deliberately played upon the theme of sovereign-as-patron, blandishing the emperor and claiming that "the genius of Napoleon III" was the primary force "protecting the destinies of Marseille and Algeria." Such flattery was interspersed with reminders of the port city's vital trade connection to North Africa and the need for sound economic policies and commercial investments, presumably by the state. "By the energetic effect of his strong will, Napoleon III will assure to Marseille and Algeria all that they must justly hope for their magnificent future," the author prophesized.⁵⁵ For Algerian colonists, the patronage of the sovereign was paramount. Possessing no political rights at the national level, and hence no actual power to influence policies applicable to the colony, they could only depend upon the good graces of the sovereign to enact legislation favorable to their interests. Although the lack of rights at the national level was a perennial grievance among colonists, settlers sought to circumvent this impediment by petitioning. Colonial petitions sought to make known the interests and desires of colonists through extra-parliamentary means, and the practice gained greater currency as the emperor's Arab Kingdom policy drove a wedge between the government and settler population during the 1860s.⁵⁶

If petitioning offered a means of giving voice to the silent colonial population, the imperial visits provided an opportunity to articulate these concerns directly to the sovereign. "People are hoping without doubt that the presence of the Emperor will assure to Algeria a general period of improvement and a remedy to the particular suffering experienced across various urban localities," asserted one book written in anticipation of the sovereign's arrival.⁵⁷

Official descriptions of the visit in 1865 framed the event in just these terms, explaining that the emperor's tour amounted to a personal inquest of the needs and potential of the colony. "I come among you to know your interests for myself," Napoleon III stated when speaking to algerois colonists upon his arrival.⁵⁸ In the following days he met with various local officials, toured colonial settlements and spoke with agriculturalists and merchants. During the official inspection, Napoleon III assumed the image of the paternal emperor, a reminder of the bond of both sovereign and *patrie* binding a multinational settler community to France. The royal connotations implicit within this relationship were not absent either. As the president of the colony's Société Imperiale d'Agriculture noted to Napoleon III upon their meeting: "In previous centuries, whenever people felt a wrong had been committed, they would cry out: *if the King only knew!* For us Algerian colonists, conscious of a certain feebleness attributed to us at times, we never cease to say to ourselves: *Ah! If only the Emperor could see!*"⁵⁹

Those outside official circles were no less eager to make their opinion known to the sovereign. A flurry of pamphlets and newspaper articles aimed to present colonist wishes in a clear and consistent voice, stating desires for representative government and the political rights that belonged to all French citizens. Joseph Guérin, a journalist dedicated to the cause of colonial enfranchisement, consciously framed these demands in the dominant idiom of Bonapartist political culture. He urged the importance of demonstrating the work and achievements of the colonial population to the emperor during his visit in order to familiarize him with the robust initiatives taking place in Algeria.⁶⁰ Yet he also employed the Bonapartist discourse of patriotism and national unity to make a case for colonial civil and political rights. Colonists should be free to engage in municipal and local politics, which were neither based on factional ties nor party politics that might divide society. "Here we are all united because a single sentiment [animates

us] . . . the desire to make a strong Algeria within France and to recognize in this manner what France will do for us.” In Guérin’s appraisal, elected municipal bodies and local liberties were essential to the Bonapartist idea of sovereignty. Through elected bodies, the emperor would come to know the needs and desires of the colonial population, reinforcing that sacred relationship between sovereign and people. “Our Sovereign, who has wanted to be placed in direct communication with the population, can only persist in a way that gives truth free access to Him,” Guérin contended.⁶¹ In essence, what colonists were calling for was the creation of a trans-Mediterranean electorate, one afforded access to Algerian policymaking and, by proxy, incorporated into the bond uniting emperor and people.

While colonists appealed to the democratic elements implicit in Bonapartism and emphasized their desire to communicate directly with their sovereign, the problem remained that the European colonists were only one constituent part of Algerian society as the emperor was coming to imagine it. The Arab Kingdom policy officially announced in 1863 altered Algerian politics in significant ways as the state came to endorse not only native integration but native cultural and national development. After 1863, officials maligned by critics as “Arabophiles” pushed through policies aimed at bolstering cooperation with Muslim religious notables and “regenerating” a decadent Arab nationality. This supposed “Arab” nationality was a creation of the Algerian military administration and Arab Offices, and encompassed a heterogeneous North African population including Turks and Berbers who neither spoke Arabic nor identified with an Arab ethnicity.⁶² Nonetheless, the policy recognized a distinct national group with its own customs, history and culture that existed alongside the European settler population. “The natives, like the colonists, have an equal right to my protection,” declared Napoleon III. “I am the Emperor of the Arabs just as I am the Emperor of the French.”⁶³

This vision was driven home during the official state visits to Algeria as public spectacles and ceremonies attempted to cultivate the image of Napoleon III as an “Arab” emperor. The daily performances put on for the imperial entourage testified to the diverse nature of Algerian society and incorporated aspects of traditional Maghribine custom. Arab horsemanship was on full display in the fantasia, just as was gazelle hunting and dancing performances by dervishes. In the evenings, Napoleon III met with tribal leaders and *sheiks*, accepting gifts and bestowing on them Napoleonic medals and awards. While perceptions of “authentic” Arab culture remained highly stylized and consistent with the nineteenth-century culture of Orientalism, these performances and rituals were more than expressions of colonial exoticism. They amounted to an exercise in self-fashioning as Napoleon III crafted an image of himself as a nominally Arab ruler. This image testified to an imperial rather than strictly “colonial” culture in which the public figure of the sovereign was capable of representing and embodying multiple forms of attachment befitting a multiethnic empire.⁶⁴ Moreover, as journalists and commentators noted, the image of “*le sultan Napoléon*” was a convincing one that assumed substance through the public presence and visibility of the emperor.⁶⁵ “Before the arrival of the Emperor the Arabs showed themselves very avid to see His Imperial Majesty, but they continued to call him *le sultan kebir des Roumis* [Sultan of the Romans]” one newspaper stated in 1860. “Today, they all call him ‘our Emperor’.”⁶⁶

The *fête arabe* staged during both imperial visits equally incorporated religious spectacle, presenting Napoleon III not only as an Arab ruler but a guardian and benefactor of *dar al-Islam*. Speeches given to primarily Muslim audiences were peppered with Quranic verse and assurances that Muslims would be permitted to practice their religion under French aegis.⁶⁷ “[These speeches] have provoked and led some to believe that the Emperor might well not be a Christian

as previously supposed,” one colonist amusingly noted in 1865. “He is familiar with the Qur’an and not afraid to cite it.”⁶⁸ In these addresses, Napoleon III affirmed his commitment to protecting Islam and made explicit allusion to Muhammad as a source of authority, underscoring his legitimacy as a Muslim ruler. “Your Prophet said: God gives the power to he who he wants. But in taking this power from him I seek to exercise it in your interest and for your wellbeing,” he stated. “You have understood that being your Sovereign, I am your protector.”⁶⁹ These declarations were printed up, affixed to the walls of mosques and publicized among the native populations. In tandem with these addresses, colonial officials employed religious pageantry and discourse to full effect in an effort to reify the image of *le sultan Napoléon*. In a highly-choreographed performance, Napoleon III met with the head mufti at the Jamma al-Jdid mosque in 1865, reiterating his assurance of France’s good faith vis-à-vis its Muslim subjects. Prayers were recited by religious officials as “the priests of Muhammad” bestowed their blessing on the emperor. For a Bonapartist proponent like Saint-Félix, the congruities with Napoleon I’s abortive Egyptian campaign of 1798 only highlighted the sense of dynastic continuity that the regime coveted. “Dignified successor of his uncle, Napoleon III knew to speak to all his subjects according to their religion, habits and language.”⁷⁰

Speeches and festivities staged for the sake of the native population certainly demonstrated Napoleon III’s skill at “playing Muslim,” but these efforts at self-fashioning were never divorced from the general conception of sovereignty adhered to by Bonapartists. During the state visit *le sultan Napoléon* also bestowed awards on European colonists, met with the Algerian arch-bishop and attended mass in Algiers and Blida. If Napoleon III spoke the political language of Islam, he equally espoused the discourse of a Christian and national sovereign. In these various iterations of sovereignty, Napoleon III adroitly cultivated the image of a national

monarch capable of uniting all the peoples of a diverse French empire. In this context, Bonapartism elaborated and even prefigured many of the symbols and discourses that would characterize the “invented traditions” and pageantry of royal government later in the century. The pretense of a Napoleonic sultan anticipated the Ottomanism and Islamism of the Hamidian era just as Bonapartist national dynasticism hinted at the “dynastic patriotism” cultivated in the latter years of the Habsburg Empire.⁷¹ That the French polity would move in a decisively republican direction after 1870 should not obscure the continuities that exist with later developments across the continent as absolutist regimes underwent a phase of ideological retrenchment to accommodate the currents of modern nationalism.

The particular style of Bonapartist discourse lent itself to multiple representations of sovereignty that permitted Napoleon III to be, at once, a French and Arab emperor. These identities acquired their consistency through the public spectacles and pageantry staged during the two official visits to the colony. In festivities and official proclamations, the image promoted was that of a multiethnic French imperial community over a homogenous national one. Through its dynastic and patriotic elements, Bonapartism was capable of advancing a brand of imperial diversity that both spoke to republican ideas of national sovereignty while drawing upon older forms of corporatism and social exclusivity. Yet even as Bonapartist policies constructed an imagined French imperial community, they simultaneously engendered and reinforced many of divisions running through the heart of Algerian society. In appealing to colonial subjects, Bonapartism distinguished between a European constituency juxtaposed against a native community defined in the terms of its Arab nationality and Islamic identification. These grouping would characterize the frontlines of an ongoing struggle over Algerian sovereignty and, later, independence, throughout the century. Maintaining both an “Arab Kingdom” and a

“French Algeria” was only sustainable through an authoritative sovereign capable of representing and publicly engaging with a plurality of social groups and interests. Once this lynchpin was removed, the common imperial edifice would collapse.

IV.

Iterations of Bonapartist sovereignty in Algeria shed light on the various inconsistencies and ambiguities that have often been attributed to a movement which at once appeared authoritarian, popular and democratic in substance. Imperial politics encouraged public displays of loyalty and spectacle, giving Bonapartism a distinct culture that drew upon and synthesized a number of different political traditions and discourses. It relied strongly upon a sacralized vision of sovereignty, emphasizing the bond uniting people and emperor, nation and ruler. This discourse inspired emotive displays of devotion that could assume numerous forms of expression and adapt itself to national and imperial frameworks as needed. If the impassioned and unanimous crowd took center stage in national narratives, the colonial milieu brought forth a range of representations molded to fit the contours of an inherently diverse society. In Algeria, the various registers of Bonapartist political culture were on full display, fusing elements of religion, nationality and dynastic loyalty to varying degrees. Through public celebrations and imperial pageantry, the Second Empire used the forms of a revolutionary political culture to articulate a brand of imperial and dynastic sovereignty that deviated from republican principles in crucial ways.

The post-revolutionary period was, in many ways, a laboratory in which contending ideologies merged and took on hybridized forms. While 1870 is commonly thought of as a “break” in French modern history, it is difficult to ignore that the founders of the Third Republic

were responsive to the Bonapartist culture that loomed over the formative years of their political and journalistic careers.⁷² By the tail end of the Second Empire, republicans showed a readiness to adopt certain elements of the Bonapartist script and translate them into republican terms. Speaking to a crowd of Algerian colonists in 1868, Jules Favre, an inveterate defender of settler interests in Paris, seemed to be taking a page from the Bonapartist playbook. Addressing the crowd as fellow “citizens,” he proceeded to emphasize the important link that existed between a political representative and his constituency, transposing Bonapartist ideas of sovereignty into a republican idiom. “Between us there is a bond that exists between all men who support a common idea and [this bond] is now strengthened at this very moment by our personal contact,” he told his audience.⁷³ If mention of the bond uniting representative and people and the emphasis on personal contact was reminiscent of Bonapartist political discourse, there was, nonetheless, a significant difference. This sacralized politic only applied to an imagined body of European citizens. It did not extend to the various communities and “tribes” populating France’s vast empire. The Bonapartist synthesis relied upon a personal form of rule that situated a plurality of cultural and social groups in relation to the sovereign. Republican democracy confined this “sacred” bond to an atomized citizenry invested with universal rights.⁷⁴ Republicans like Favre may have been disposed to borrow certain aspects of Bonapartist discourse, yet they were not inclined to compromise their principles. Supplanting the diversified imperial sovereignty of Bonapartist personal rule was the republican logic of colonial citizenship and differentiation, and with it the ideology that would underpin a republican vision of empire in the years ahead.

Notes

¹ “Arrivée de S. M. l’Empereur à Alger,” *Moniteur de l’Algérie*, 4 May 1865.

² Patrice de MacMahon, *Mémoires: Souvenirs d’Algérie* (Paris, 1923), 305.

³ Wilfred de Fonvielle, *L’Empereur en Algérie* (Paris, 1860).

⁴ *Akhbar*, 4 May 1865.

⁵ “Proclamation de l’Empereur au peuple arabe,” *Moniteur de l’Algérie*, 6 May 1865.

⁶ Eugène Fourmestiaux, *Les idées Napoléoniennes en Algérie* (Paris, 1866), 6.

⁷ Frédéric Bluche, *Le bonapartisme: Aux origines de la droite autoritaire* (Paris, 1980), 336.

⁸ John Rothney, *Bonapartism After Sedan* (New York, 1969), 22; Sudhir Hazareesingh, “‘A Common Sentiment of National Glory’: Civic Festivities and French Collective Sentiment Under the Second Empire,” *The Journal of Modern History*, 76 (June 2004): 308; John Bierman, *Napoleon III and his Carnival Empire* (New York, 1988).

⁹ Bernard Ménager, *Les Napoléon du peuple* (Paris, 1988); Theodore Zeldin, *Emile Ollivier and the Liberal Empire of Napoleon III* (London, 1963); Jacques-Olivier Boudon, *Paris capitale religieuse sous le Second Empire* (Paris, 2001); David I. Kulstein, *Napoleon III and the Working Class: A Study of Government Propaganda under the Second Empire* (California, 1969); Chloé Gaboriaux, *La République en quête de citoyens: Les républicains français face au bonapartisme rural, 1848-1880* (Paris, 2010).

¹⁰ William H. Sewell, Jr. “The French Revolution and the Emergence of the Nation Form,” *Revolutionary Currents: Nation Building in the Transatlantic World*, eds., Michael A. Morrison and Melinda Zook (London, 2004), 91-118; Jennifer Ngairé Heuer, “Did Everything Change? Rethinking Revolutionary Legacies,” *The Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution*, ed., David Andress (Oxford, 2015), 626-37.

¹¹ Ian Coller, *Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 1798-1831* (Berkeley, 2011); Joshua Schreier, "Napoleon's Long Shadow: Morality, Civilization and Jews in France and Algeria, 1808-1870," *French Historical Studies*, 30:1 (Winter 2007): 80-85; Stuart Woolf, "French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire," *Past and Present*, 124 (August 1989): 96-120.

¹² Daniel L. Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916* (West Lafayette, 2005).

¹³ For example: Rebecca Hartkopf Schloss, *Sweet Liberty: The Final Days of Slavery in Martinique* (Philadelphia, 2009); Silyane Larcher, *L'Autre citoyen: L'idéal républicain et les Antilles après l'esclavage* (Paris, 2014); Jennifer Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, 2011); Andrew Arsan, "There is in the Heart of Asia . . . An Entirely French Population: France, Mount Lebanon, and the Workings of Affective Empire in the Mediterranean, 1830-1920," *French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories*, eds., Patricia M. E. Lorcin and Todd Shepard (Lincoln, 2016), 76-100.

¹⁴ David Todd, "A French Imperial Meridian, 1815-1870," *Past and Present*, 210 (February 2011): 155-86.

¹⁵ Rothney, *Bonapartism After Sedan*, 292-94; Bluche, *Le bonapartisme*; Peter Davies, *The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From De Maistre to Le Pen* (London, 2002), 23.

¹⁶ Samuel Kalman, *French Colonial Fascism: The Extreme Right in Algeria, 1919-1939* (London, 2013).

¹⁷ Juan Cole, "Playing Muslim: Bonaparte's Army of the Orient and Euro-Muslim Creolization," *The Age of Revolution in Global Context, c. 1760-1840*, eds., David Armitage and Sanjay Subahmanyam (Houndsmill, 2010), 125-141; Ian Coller, "Egypt in the French Revolution," *The*

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¹⁸ Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in French West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford, 1997); Laurent Dubois, *A Colony of Citizens: Revolution and Slave Emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787-1804* (Chapel Hill, 2004); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism Between the Two World Wars* (Chicago, 2005); Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship Between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton, 2016); Andrea L. Smith, "Citizenship in the Colony: Naturalization Law and Legal Assimilation in Nineteenth-Century Algeria." *Polar*, 11:1 (1996): 33-50.

¹⁹ Stéphane Gerson, *The Pride of Place: Local Memories and Political Culture in Nineteenth-Century France* (Ithaca, 2003); Steven D. Kale, *Legitimism and the Reconstruction of French Society, 1852-1883* (Baton Rouge, 1992); Sudhir Hazareesingh, *From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French Democracy* (Princeton, 1998).

²⁰ Matthew Truesdell, *Spectacular Politics: Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and the Fête Impériale, 1849-1870* (New York, 1997).

²¹ Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, *Discours, messages et proclamations de l'Empereur* (Paris, 1860), 226.

²² Persigny, "Circulaire sur les élections de 1852," *Le Duc de Persigny et les doctrines de l'Empire*, ed., Joseph Delaroa (Paris, 1865), 39.

²³ Edward Warmington, *Qu'est-ce que le Bonapartisme?* (Paris, 1852), 94.

²⁴ A noted exception is Claude Nicolet who has claimed that between 1815 and 1870 political discourse attempted to avoid the revolutionary association between the nation and sovereignty. The Second Empire, in his view, sought to root its legitimacy in constitutional practices and established powers rather than a conception of a sovereign national community. See: *L'Idée Républicaine en France* (Paris, 1982), 17.

²⁵ Ménager, *Les Napoléon du peuple*.

²⁶ *Le Temps*, 10 May 1863.

²⁷ Philip Dwyer, "Napoleon, The Revolution, and The Empire," *Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution*, 574-83.

²⁸ Pierre Rosanvallon, *La Démocratie inachevée: Histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en France* (Paris, 2000), 196-97; Raymond Huard, *La naissance du parti politique en France* (Paris, 1996), 112; Hazareesingh, "A Common Sentiment of National Glory," 310; Juliette Glikman, "Vœu populaire et bien public, 1852-1870," *Parlement[s]: Revue d'histoire politique*, 4 (2008): 87-91.

²⁹ Quoted in Frédéric Salmon, "La 'gauche avancée' en 1849 et en 1870," *Les républicains sous le Second Empire*, ed., Léo Hamon (Paris, 1993) 98.

³⁰ Sudhir Hazareesingh, *The Saint-Napoleon: Celebrations of Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century France* (Cambridge, 2004); James R. Lehning, *The Melodramatic Thread: Spectacle and Political Culture in Modern France* (Bloomington, 2007), 41-42.

³¹ On Bonartism and patriotism, see: Sudhir Hazareesingh, "Memory, Legend and Politics: Napoleonic Patriotism in the Restoration Era," *European Journal of Political Theory*, 5:1 (2006): 71-84.

³² Daniel de Grangues, *La France sous la quatrième dynastie* (Paris, 1858), 150.

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- ³³ M. Granier de Cassagnac to M. Conti, 25 April 1870, *Papiers et Correspondance de la Famille Impériale* (Paris, 1871), 1:165.
- ³⁴ Truesdell, *Spectacular Politics*, 10.
- ³⁵ *Voyage de LL. Mm. L'Empereur et L'Impératrice dans les départements du sud-est, de la Savoie, de la Corse et de l'Algérie* (Paris, 1860), 17.
- ³⁶ *La Presse*, 9 and 16 September 1860.
- ³⁷ Réne de Saint-Félix, *Napoléon III en Algérie et la Régence de S.M. L'Impératrice* (Paris, 1865), 203-04, vii.
- ³⁸ *Voyage de Leurs Majestés en Algérie* (Paris, 1860), 27.
- ³⁹ *Voyage de S.M. Napoléon III en Algérie* (Algiers, 1865), xi.
- ⁴⁰ *Voyage de LL. Mm. L'Empereur*, 96.
- ⁴¹ Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, "Alger: Notes au crayon," *Pages retrouvées* (Paris, 1886), 267-68; *Voyage de Leurs Majestés en Algérie*, 10.
- ⁴² Lahouari Addi, "Colonial Mythologies: Algeria in the French Imagination," *Franco-Arab Encounters*, eds., L. Carl Brown and Matthew S. Gordon (Lebanon, 1996), 102-03.
- ⁴³ Jules Duval, "L'Anniversaire du 13 Juin en Algérie," *Revue de l'Orient* (1852), 12:94, 90.
- ⁴⁴ "Excursion de l'Empereur dans l'arrondissement d'Alger," *Moniteur de l'Algérie*, 5 May 1865.
- ⁴⁵ *Voyage de Leurs Majestés en Algérie*, 11.
- ⁴⁶ Reprinted in "Abd-el-Kader," *La Presse*, 11 January 1852.
- ⁴⁷ *La Presse*, 7 May 1852.
- ⁴⁸ Saliha Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies* (Oxford, 2013), 128-47; Osama W. Abi-Mershed, *Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and*

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⁴⁹ Marcel Emerit, ed., *La révolution de 1848 en Algérie* (Paris, 1949); Gavin Murray-Miller, "Imagining the Trans-Mediterranean Republic: Algeria, Republicanism and the Origins of the French Imperial Nation-State, 1848-1870," *French Historical Studies*, 37:2 (Spring 2014): 303-30.

⁵⁰ *Akhbar*, 26 December 1851.

⁵¹ *Akhbar*, 20 December 1851.

⁵² *Akhbar*, 14 December 1852.

⁵³ *Akhbar*, 2 December 1852.

⁵⁴ *Akhbar*, 23 December 1852.

⁵⁵ *Napoléon III: Marseille et L'Algérie* (Marseille, 1860), 5, 35.

⁵⁶ For example, see: Alexandre Lambert, "La petition au Sénat," *L'Echo d'Oran*, 12 February 1863.

⁵⁷ Le Méyater des Planches, *L'Empereur en Algérie* (Algiers, 1865), 11.

⁵⁸ *Voyage de S.M. Napoléon III en Algérie*, 23.

⁵⁹ Octave Teissier, *Napoléon III en Algérie* (Paris, 1865), xiiij.

⁶⁰ Joseph Guérin, "Aux Algeriens," *Akhbar*, 2 May 1865.

⁶¹ Joseph Guérin, "Les élections," *Akhbar*, 12 May 1865

⁶² Yvonne Turin, *Affrontements culturels dans l'Algérie colonial: écoles, médecines, religion, 1830-1880* (Algiers, 1983), 256, 280; Elia Gaston Giedji, *L'Enseignement indigène en Algérie au*

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⁶³ Archives Nationales, 234 AP 4, "Lettre de Sa Majesté l'Empereur," 6 February 1863.

⁶⁴ For distinctions between colonial and imperial society, see: Alain Messaoudi, *Les Arabisants en la France colonial, 1780-1930* (Paris, 2015), 328-29.

⁶⁵ *Voyage de Leurs Majestés en Algérie*, 34.

⁶⁶ Auguste Vitu, "Voyage de l'Empereur," *Le Constitutionnelle*, 28 September 1860

⁶⁷ For the specific Quranic suna, see: *La Presse*, 11 May 1865.

⁶⁸ André Nouschi, ed., *Correspondance du Docteur A. Vital avec I. Urbain* (Paris, 1959), 144.

⁶⁹ Fourmestraux, *Les Idées Napoléoniennes en Algérie*, 55-56.

⁷⁰ Saint-Félix, *Napoléon III en Algérie*, 205, 106-07.

⁷¹ Selim Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 35:1 (January 1993): 3-29; Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism*.

⁷² Pamela M. Pilbeam, *Republicanism in Nineteenth-Century France, 1814-1871* (New York, 1995), 275.

⁷³ *Le Temps*, 6 November 1868.

⁷⁴ Jeremy Jennings, "Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France," *British Journal of Political Science*, 30:4 (October 2000): 575-597; Dominique Schapper, *Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality* (New Brunswick, 1998), 12-29; Emmanuelle Saada, *Empire's Children: Race, Filiation and Citizenship in the French Colonies* (Chicago, 2007); Elizabeth Thompson, *Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege*

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